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ABSTRACT 
Mainstream research on boards of directors has been focusing on a direct relationship 
between board characteristics and firm performance, but up till now the results are 
inconclusive. Although these studies revealed interesting and useful insights, little is 
known about the factors that shape board effectiveness. This paper aims to reduce this gap 
by exploring the variety of indicators that contribute to the effectiveness of boards. The 
paper derives from an interview-based investigation among 104 directors of Belgian listed 
companies. The findings are further elaborated with quantitative data from two written 
questionnaires, involving directors of non-listed companies and experts in the field of 
corporate governance. The results point to three major issues. First, there appears to be a 
gap between a limited number of structural board measures consistently found in 
literature and the systematic occurrence of a set of behavioural criteria of board 
effectiveness in the perceptions of (Belgian) directors. Second, the findings suggest that 
the value of independence may be overemphasized at the cost of the broader issue of 
diversity. Third, it appears that mainstream board research ignores to a large extent two 
additional conditions (the information flow and the leadership style of the chairman) 
under which a board of directors can make an effective contribution to the strategic 
direction and control of a company. Our findings suggest that the ambiguity found in 
current research evidence can to some extent be attributed to the ignorance of a wide 
range of interconnected structural (such as diversity and competence) and behavioural 
factors (such as trust, attitude, norms and conduct) which actually shape the effectiveness 
of boards in performing their roles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Boards of directors are of interest to academics, the investment community, the 
business world and society at large. According to Cadbury (1999) this attention is 
understandable, given the fact that boards of directors serve as a bridge between the 
shareholders, who provide capital, and management in charge of running the company. At 
the heart of the corporate governance debate is the view that the board of directors is the 
guardian of shareholders’ interest (Dalton et.al., 1998). Yet, boards are being criticized 
for failing to meet their governance responsibilities. Major institutional investors put 
pressure on (incompetent) directors and have long advocated changes in the board 
structure (Monks and Minow, 2001). Their call has been strengthened by many corporate 
governance reforms resulting from major corporate failures. The reforms put great 
emphasis on formal issues such as board independence, board leadership structure, board 
size and committees (Weil, Gotshal and Manges, 2002; Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 
1999). These structural measures are assumed to be important means to enhance the 
power of the board, protect shareholders’ interest, and hence, increase shareholder wealth 
(Becht et.al., 2002; Westphal, 1998). 
The interest of the investment and business community in the effectiveness of 
corporate boards undeniable stimulated academic research. Empirical studies on boards of 
directors are to a large extent triggered by a common question, i.e. whether boards of 
directors have an impact on corporate performance. Early research on US boards showed 
a sad picture as it concluded that boards of directors are rather passive, dominated by 
management and their impact is in fact minimal (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Drucker, 
1974; Mace, 1971). From a different angle, an extensive body of research has examined 
the direct impact of board attributes on firm performance. By using a firm’s financial 
performance as a proxy, scholars have been able to empirically test a board’s 
effectiveness in protecting shareholders’ interests. Most of these studies have, however, 
shown inconclusive results (see the reviews by Coles et.al., 2001 and Dalton et.al., 1998). 
Another stream of research has investigated the influence of board attributes on the 
performance of board roles, suggesting an indirect causal relationship between boards of 
directors and company performance (see the reviews by Deutch, 2005 and Johnson et.al., 
1996).  
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A common feature of all these studies is the focus on a limited number of 
characteristics related to board composition namely insider/outsider representation, board 
size and CEO duality. This comes as no surprise as (i) their importance is recognized by 
the various theoretical perspectives on board research (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), (ii) they 
are common targets of those who seek to reform the corporate governance processes 
(Dalton et.al., 1998), and (iii) a vast majority of these studies relies on archival data 
gathering techniques and structural board measures provide the relative ease of data 
collection (Daily et.al., 2003).  
Notwithstanding the fact that market parties (investors, corporate governance 
activists etc.) and scholars attach great importance to the same board issues, there are few 
definitive and striking findings to link these structural board characteristics to 
performance outcomes (Daily et.al., 2003). Due to the lack of clear and solid academic 
evidence, the appropriateness of these board measures as adequate proxies for 
understanding board effectiveness can be questioned. Almost two decades ago, Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) already argued that there is “a growing awareness of the need to understand 
better how boards can improve their effectiveness as instruments of corporate governance 
(…). The starting point for future research involves conducting extensive field work to 
understand better, document and operationalize board variables. More descriptive work is 
necessary before normative board models or theories can be advanced” (p. 327). Some 
scholars have tried to overcome the limitations in mainstream board research by 
examining the explanatory value of individual director characteristics (van der Walt and 
Ingley, 2003; Kesner, 1988; Vance, 1978), board working style (Gabrielsson and 
Winlund, 2000) and board processes (Cornforth, 2001) for the effectiveness of boards. In 
addition, recent qualitative research into boards of directors (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; 
Roberts et.al., 2005; Huse et.al., 2005) as well as more practitioner literature (e.g. Charan, 
2005; Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Sonnenfeld, 2002) have brought the importance of 
studying boardroom dynamics to researchers’ attention. Unfortunately the conduct of 
extensive field work (as called upon by Zahra and Pearce (1989)) remains limited, not in 
the least because of difficulties of gaining access to boardrooms and directors.  
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Hence, a sufficient insight into the complex web of criteria which enables (or 
hampers) boards of directors to be effective in conducting their roles and ultimately 
creating shareholder wealth is - to a large extent - still lacking (Leblanc and Gillies, 
2005). 
The purpose of this study is to try to fill this void as much as possible, by 
identifying and exploring the broad variety of criteria that may influence board 
effectiveness. In particular, this paper addresses the following research question: What 
are the key factors that contribute to the effectiveness of boards of directors?. We will 
investigate this question by means of a mixed methods research design, involving boards 
of directors of both listed and non-listed Belgian companies as well as other actors in the 
field. Particularly, we will explore a set of qualitative and quantitative data generated 
from a sample of directors, who expresses their views on the criteria of board 
effectiveness, based on their own (board) experience. This paper is organized in four 
sections. First, we outline the theoretical background. The second section contains an 
explanation of the research methodology, focusing on the mixed methods research design. 
The third section presents the results of our study. We end this paper by discussing our 
findings and drawing conclusions.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In studying boards of directors, academic research has been concerned with 
mainly three board characteristics: composition, leadership structure and size. They are 
commonly identified by the basic theoretical perspectives on boards of directors and by 
consequence assumed to be important proxies for understanding board effectiveness 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
Board composition as key determinant. The bulk of academic research on 
boards of directors examines the role and the proportion of inside, outside and 
independent directors. In essence, two theories prevail to explain the reliance either on 
insider or outsider-dominated boards. Agency theory, which dominates corporate 
governance research, is concerned with the conflicts of interest that may occur between 
the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents).  
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Separation of ownership and control provides the potential for managers to pursue 
actions which maximise their self-interest at the expense of the shareholders. The board of 
directors serves as an internal control mechanism in order to monitor management and to 
ensure shareholders’ welfare (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
an agency perspective, effectiveness is presumed to be a function of board independence 
from management. Applied to the composition of the board of directors, agency theory 
prescribes a preponderance of independent outside directors. The opposite perspective is 
grounded in stewardship theory, which perceives managers as good stewards of the 
company assets. Managers have a range of non-financial motives, such as the intrinsic 
satisfaction of successful performance, the need for achievement and recognition etc., 
which restrain them to misappropriate corporate resources at any price. Reallocation of 
control from shareholders to management leads to maximization of corporate profits and 
hence shareholder returns (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Based on these assumptions, 
stewardship theory suggests a board of directors dominated by insiders. The empirical 
findings of academic research on board composition, however, do not reveal a consistent 
picture.  
First, a rich body of literature has investigated the direct impact of board 
composition on a company’s financial performance, but yielded mixed results. Several 
researchers have studied the effects of outsider-dominated boards on shareholder wealth 
and have found positive results. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) reported that 
firms with higher proportions of independent directors ended up with superior 
performance records (as measured by return on equity). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) 
found that a clearly identifiable announcement of the appointment of an outside director 
leads to positive effects on the firm’s share price. In contrast, there is also a series of 
studies that do not support the postulated positive relationship. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(2001) and Coles et.al. (2001) reported a negative impact of greater representation of 
outside directors on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q respectively Market 
Value Added. In addition, Kesner’s findings (1987) indicate a positive association 
between the proportion of inside directors and two indicators of firm financial 
performance, profit margin and return on assets. Still others are more reserved on the 
effects of board composition on corporate performance.  
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Wagner et. al. (1998) conclude that both, greater insider and outsider 
representation can have a positive impact on performance while a meta-analyses by 
Dalton et.al. (1998) demonstrates that there is virtually no substantive relationship 
between board composition and financial performance.  
Another stream of empirical research suggests that board composition is related to 
the board’s undertaking of its roles but again the results are mixed. A fair amount of 
evidence supports the assumption that outside directors have been effective in monitoring 
management and protecting shareholder interests. Outsider-dominated boards are 
significantly more likely to replace an underperforming CEO (Weisbach, 1988), to 
prevent management from paying greenmail (Kosnik, 1987), are more involved in 
restructuring decisions (Johnson et. al., 1993) and are better able to distinguish between 
good and bad acquisitions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). In contrast, some researchers do 
not support the notion that independent directors are effective guardians of shareholders’ 
interest. For instance, no significant relationship was found between the proportion of 
independent directors and the adoption of a poison pill provision (Mallette and Fowler, 
1992) or the number of illegal acts committed by management (Kesner et.al., 1986). 
Moreover, some results are rather in favour of insider-dominated boards. Research shows 
that the proportion of inside directors has a positive impact on R&D spending (Baysinger 
et.al., 1991), innovation and diversification strategies (Hill and Snell, 1988) and is 
negatively associated with the incidence of golden parachute agreements (Cochran et. al., 
1985).  
 
Board leadership structure as key determinant. Board leadership structure 
refers to whether or not there are separate persons who serve in the roles of CEO and 
chairman of the board. Agency theory as well as stewardship theory are also relevant to 
explain the leadership structure of boards. In an agency perspective, the separation of the 
roles of CEO and chairman of the board is prescribed as a measure for more independent 
oversight. Splitting these roles dilutes the power of the CEO, avoids CEO entrenchment 
and reduces the potential for management to dominate the board. A separate board 
leadership structure provides the required check and balances and hence positively 
influences company performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
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This view runs counter to other thinking about CEO duality. In fact, proponents of 
stewardship theory suggest that if the CEO also serves as the chairman, this duality 
provides unified firm leadership, builds trust and stimulates the motivation to perform. In 
this perspective, joint leadership structure facilitates better firm performance (see e.g. 
Finkelstein and D’Avanti, 1994; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Empirical research on 
board leadership structure is rather limited and provides inconclusive results supporting, 
both perspectives. 
Only a limited number of studies have empirically examined the effects of CEO 
duality on firm performance. Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Coles et al. (2001) 
reported a positive relationship between a combined leadership structure and shareholder 
returns (as measured by return on equity), respectively Economic Value Added. In 
contrast, Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms with separate board leadership 
structure outperformed -over a six-year time period- those relying upon a joint structure. 
However, a small amount of studies show no relationship between board leadership 
structure and firm performance (e.g. Dalton et.al., 1998, Baliga et al., 1996; Chaganti 
et.al., 1985). Another way of approaching this issue is by studying the joint effect of 
board leadership structure and board composition. In this respect a robust interaction 
effect is suggested between firm bankruptcy and board structure. Firms that combine the 
CEO and chairman roles and that have lower representation of independent directors are 
associated with bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton, 1994 a; Daily and Dalton, 1994 b). 
 
Board size as key determinant. Board size is a well-studied board characteristic 
for two different reasons. First, the size of the board is believed to have an impact on firm 
performance. In particular, in accordance with agency theory, the number of directors 
frequently serves as an indicator of CEO domination of the board. Increasing the number 
of directors makes it more difficult for the CEO to dominate the board and hence enables 
the board to better monitor management and corporate performance (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). Besides, the importance of board size is also recognized by resource dependency 
theory. The central postulate of this theory is that external parties hold resources which a 
business organization perceives as crucial to the realization of its internal objectives 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
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In order to acquire and maintain these resources, a company seeks to establish 
links with its environment and the board of directors is a vehicle to do so. According to 
this perspective, a larger board of directors is assumed to be more capable of co-opting 
external influences, thus obtaining valuable resources that are inevitable for corporate 
success (Johnson et.al., 1996). Based on these assumptions, a positive association 
between board size and corporate performance became conventional wisdom but the 
evidence of empirical research on this issue is rather inconsistent. Some early studies 
provide positive evidence for varying industries. According to Provan (1980), board size 
is one of the strongest predictors of organizational effectiveness in the human service 
sector. Chaganti et. al. (1985) compared the board size of failed and non-failed firms in 
the retailing industry and found that larger boards were associated with a higher rate of 
corporate survival. Pearce and Zahra (1992) found a significant positive relationship 
between board size and different measures of financial performance, using data from 
Fortune 500 industrial companies. In contrast, more recent studies reported opposite 
results. Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship between board size and firm 
market value, using a sample of large US public companies. Similar results were reported 
using European data. Eisenberg et. al. (1998) studied small non-listed Finnish firms and 
found a negative correlation between a firm’s profitability and the size of its board, while 
the study of Conyon and Peck (1998) shows an inverse relationship between return on 
shareholders’ equity and board size for five European countries.  
Second, from a completely different angle, boards of directors are approached as 
decision-making groups. In this respect, board size serves as a proxy measure of 
directors’ expertise. Larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skill at their 
disposal and the ability of boards to draw on a variety of perspectives likely contributes to 
the quality of the decision-making (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). However, expanding the 
number of directors might significantly inhibit the working of a board, due to the potential 
group dynamic problems associated with larger groups (Jensen, 1993). Consequently, 
larger boards may be hampered in reaching a consensus on important decisions (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999).  
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A limited number of studies empirically examined the influence of board size with 
respect to strategic decision-making. Judge and Zeithalm (1992) found that board size 
was negatively associated with board involvement in strategic decisions, concluding that 
when boards get too large, effective debate and discussion are limited and the interaction 
between individual members is lower. Goodstein et.al. (1994) have explored the effects of 
board size on strategic changes initiated by organizations. Their results indicate that large 
boards have limited effectiveness in directing strategic change during periods of 
environmental turbulence. Also Golden and Zajac (2001) found that strategic change is 
significantly affected by board size. In particular, their findings indicate that an increase 
in board size is negatively related to strategic change for larger boards. 
 
To summarize, the above mentioned studies show that there is no robust evidence 
on the relationship between structural characteristics of boards of directors and board or 
company performance. Although these studies revealed interesting and useful insights, the 
absence of clear empirical support of substantive relationships casts doubt on both the 
efficacy of agency theory as the dominant governance theory and the appropriateness of 
structural board measures as adequate proxies for understanding board effectiveness. In 
particular, the vast majority of empirical studies are being criticized for using a too 
narrow focus in assessing the effectiveness of boards in performing their governance role 
and its contribution to firm financial performance (Daily et al., 2003). It seems that our 
knowledge on the effectiveness of boards is hampered not only by the applied data 
gathering techniques but also by inadequate attention to the potentially large number of 
intervening variables between board characteristics and performance outcomes (Roberts 
et al., 2005; Pettigrew, 1992).  
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METHODS 
As indicated above, the vast majority of studies on boards of directors have relied 
upon quantitative data gathering techniques (Daily et.al., 2003). These techniques include 
mainly large scale archival data, while a subset of board studies have also used 
questionnaires. Although these techniques offer the advantage to analyse the data in a 
consistent way their access to process-oriented data is restricted (Daily et.al., 2003). Some 
scholars have overcome this limitation by using in-dept interviews (Roberts et al., 2005; 
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) 
and direct observation techniques (Huse and Schoning, 2004; Leblanc and Gillies, 2003). 
Their research provides an important qualitative counter-balance to the traditional surveys 
on boards of directors.  
In our study, we build upon the strengths of both approaches by opting for a mixed 
methods research design (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). More specifically, we opted for 
a sequential exploratory design (Creswell et. al., 2003). A specific feature of this design is 
its two-phase approach whereby the collection and analysis of the qualitative data in an 
initial phase is followed by a phase of quantitative data collection and analysis. More 
specifically, in the first (qualitative) research phase we try to identify - by means of 
interviews - the full set of criteria that potentially contribute to the effectiveness of 
boards. The results are then used to construct a rating survey for the second (quantitative) 
research phase which helps us in elaborating and interpreting the qualitative findings. 
Furthermore, the research design implies completely different samples and data collection 
techniques for the two phases. 
 
Sample and data collection for the qualitative phase 
Sample. For the first qualitative research phase, we selected purposively utilizing 
a critical cases sampling scheme (Collins et.al., 2006). This means we intentionally 
limited the sample to members of the boards of directors of Belgian listed companies 
because we believed that they are well-placed to provide us with compelling insights into 
the determinants of board effectiveness.  
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A sample of 147 directors of Belgian companies listed on Euronext Brussels were 
contacted and asked to participate in a large scale in-depth study on corporate governance 
in Belgium. Our sample included different directors’ roles such as chairmen, independent 
directors, non-executive directors and CEOs. Information on the companies listed on 
Euronext Brussels was found on the Euronext website (www.euronext.com). Information 
on the boards of directors was retrieved from multiple sources such as the company’s 
annual report, its website and the Belfirst database. Of the initial 147 directors that were 
contacted, a total of 104 (response rate = 71 %) agreed to participate. Table 1 presents our 
sample in terms of directors’ roles.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Data collection. Data was collected during interviews with directors of Belgian 
listed companies. For the purpose of this study, a standardized open-ended question was 
used (Johnson and Turner, 2003). In particular, the directors were asked to sum up what 
they perceived as the most important ingredients of a good board of directors. In this 
respect, multiple answers could be given. We deliberately opted not to use the term 
‘effective’ to avoid misunderstanding because the concept of effectiveness may yield 
different interpretations. By consequence, we used the word ‘good’. By phrasing the 
question in a more neutral way, we believed that each respondent had the same 
understanding of the question, which diminishes bias in the answers. In addition, by using 
an open-ended question we were able to fully capture a broad spectrum of criteria.  
 
Sample and data collection for the quantitative phase 
Sample. For the second quantitative research phase, we selected purposively 
utilizing a convenience sampling scheme (Collins et.al., 2006). This means we have 
chosen individuals that are conveniently available and willing to participate in the study. 
A sample of 715 members of the Belgian Governance Institute were contacted and asked 
to participate in our study.  
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Members include (i) directors with different roles (such as chairmen, independent-
, non-executive- or executive directors) representing boards of directors of listed as well 
as non-listed companies, and (ii) actors in the field of corporate governance (advisors, 
lawyers, academics etc.). Of the initial 715 directors that were contacted, a total of 166 
(response rate = 23%) respondents were engaged in the quantitative research phase. Next, 
in order to avoid overlap between the samples, we excluded the respondents who 
previously participated in the interviews. Incomplete responses were also rejected from 
the sample resulting in a total of 150 (response rate = 21%). The sample can be divided in 
two groups of respondents. We labelled a group “directors”, representing those persons 
who sit on boards of directors of Belgian companies and another group received the label 
“experts”, representing actors in the field of corporate governance (see table 2). 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Data collection. Two small written questionnaires were used to collect the 
quantitative data (see Appendix 1). The aim of the questionnaires was to reveal further 
gradation between various criteria which are assumed to contribute to the effectiveness of 
boards. For that purpose, we opted for structured closed-ended questionnaires whereby 
the response category took the form of rankings. The 10 questionnaire items were based 
on the themes (representing groupings of similar criteria) derived from the open-ended 
question in the qualitative phase. To avoid misunderstanding, we clearly defined what 
was meant by board effectiveness. In particular, board effectiveness was defined as “the 
degree the board is able to carry out its strategic and monitoring tasks”. Furthermore, we 
also indicated how the rankings should be interpreted. To minimize response bias, the 
respondents received the questionnaires in two steps. As previously explained, the first 
questionnaire was submitted to the respondents who were asked to rank the items 
according to their importance (1 most important - 10 least important). After a period of 
time, the respondents received the second form and were asked to indicate to what extent 
there is room for improvement in practice (1 needs most improvement - 10 needs least 
improvement).  
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RESULTS 
Qualitative analysis 
The interviews yielded a broad set of responses regarding criteria that constitute a 
good corporate board, as perceived by the directors. The qualitative data was analysed by 
coding using the ATLAS.ti software. As recommended in literature (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984), we developed a coding list, based upon the literature on boards of 
directors, insights into the corporate governance codes and complemented the list with 
themes that emerged during data analysis. This resulted in a total of 31 qualitative codes. 
The codes resemble as close as possible the directors’ responses. In a next step, we 
grouped codes that related to similar concepts and entered these groupings as ‘families’ in 
ATLAS.ti. (see Appendix 2). The creation of families is a way to form clusters and allow 
easier handling of coded material (ATLAS. Ti, 2004). In addition, we used a basic form 
of counting during the analysis process because it allowed us to more fully describe the 
variety of criteria that were cited during the interviews and it helped to maintain analytical 
integrity (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie, 2003). Table 3 provides a summary of the results. A 
detailed overview of the frequencies of each code within a family can be found in 
Appendix 3.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
The findings presented in table 3 show that aspects related to the composition of 
the board are by far most frequently reported by a great number of directors. Board 
culture which expresses more intangible aspects of the board of directors resides on the 
second place, closely followed by the operations of the board. The less frequently 
mentioned cluster refers to the relationship of the board with management. In what 
follows, each of the themes will be described in more detail. 
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Board composition1. In directors’ perceptions, in order to be effective, the board 
of directors needs to have the appropriate structure. This involves several related 
dimensions. The most frequently cited dimension refers to diversity. The board should 
comprise a mix of people having different personalities, educational, occupational and 
functional backgrounds. As some directors pointed out: “A board of directors composed 
of ‘clones’ does not work”. However, although diversity seems to be top of mind it is 
closely followed by the dimension of complementarity. Having different skills at the 
disposal of boards is a minimum requirement but they must be complementary. One 
director summarized this, using the following metaphor: “It is the mayonnaise that counts 
within a board, thanks to the different oils present”. The third dimension relates to the 
competence of individual directors. Beyond diversity and complementarity this dimension 
was cited separately as one of the key criteria. Individual directors should have a 
minimum degree of knowledge and experience. It boils down to the capacity and quality 
of the people sitting on the board. Within the cluster relating to board composition, the 
proportion of independent directors as well as the size of the board were among the least 
frequently mentioned criteria.  
In the cases where these criteria came across, it was noted that the board of 
directors should pursue a balance between executive directors, shareholders’ 
representatives and independent directors. Moreover, the board of directors should not be 
too large. 
 
Board culture2. Directors directed also much attention to the more intangible side 
of board conduct. We labelled this theme ‘board culture’ referring to a set of informal 
unwritten rules which regulates board and directors’ behaviour. The frequencies of the 
reported issues within this theme are very close. Most important there should be openness 
and transparency. Directors should have the ability to express their views and a culture of 
open debate should reign. This implies that matters should be treated inside the 
                                                 
 
1
 See Appendix 3, Table A 
2
 See Appendix 3, Table B 
 18 
boardroom and not ‘behind the scene’. One director formulated it as follows : “There 
should be no taboo.  
All subjects ought to be touched upon. Directors should utter their opposition 
against a principle. Freedom of thought is very important.” Second, involvement is also 
perceived as an important criterion. In contrast to a ceremonial, passive board, a good 
board of directors is active, interested and of added value to a company. Third, the general 
atmosphere or climate determines to some extent the way board members are expected to 
behave. This refers to a sense of humour, positive and constructive attitude, degree of 
professionalism etc.. Other dimensions with respect to board culture, but less often 
reported, are the fact that the board members needs to pursue a common vision or interest 
as well as to be vigilant and critical. 
 
Operation of the board3. It seems that directors attach much importance to the 
operation of the board of directors. In particular, the preparation of a board meeting was 
often cited as a key issue. This relates to the make-up of a board agenda and even more 
vital to the documents the directors receive in advance. A director commented: “A good 
board must be conscientiously prepared; sufficient information must be provided for each 
point on the agenda in such a manner that it allows directors to decide with full 
knowledge during board meetings”.  
Next, the role of the chairman was acknowledged. One director put it as follows: 
“The chairman is the driving force…. he is responsible for an efficient course of  board 
meeting, he is the one who takes the plunge in case of conflict, who dare to stick its neck 
out… in addition, he is the hinge between shareholders, management and the board.” 
Finally some aspects which were less frequently reported, related to the conduct of board 
meetings such as the length of board meetings (not too long), the quality of (management) 
presentations, time management etc. 
 
                                                 
 
3
 See Appendix 3, Table C 
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Board tasks4. From a different perspective, a good board of directors was viewed 
in relation to the tasks it performs. Particularly, directors place emphasis on the strategic 
role of the board. As pointed out by the directors, the board should be involved in 
determining the long term strategic direction of the company. In doing so, two additional 
comments are of interest. First, the board must have some insight into the evolution of the 
business environment. One director explained “A good board of directors is able to see 
the present, whilst keeping an eye on the future”. Second, the board must be able to 
translate the shareholder’s strategic ambitions to management. One director expressed this 
as follows: “See the company through the eyes of the shareholder”. In second order, the 
support role was mentioned. This role refers to the support the board of directors provides 
to management by means of challenging, advising and stimulating management. Some 
directors summarized this as follows: “A good board brings out the best in its 
management” Less attention is paid to the monitoring role of the board and the context 
which enables a board to fulfil it tasks. The latter refers to the degree of delegation of 
power within the corporate governance tripod. 
 
Debate/decision-making5. This theme views the board of directors as a decision-
making group. In particular, the occurrence and quality of the debate(s) are perceived as 
key criteria within this cluster. The board is not a rubber-stamping body. Real, in-depth 
discussion should take place but the deliberations should be characterised by neutrality 
and objectivity. Or as one director stated: “One should play the ball, not the man”. To a 
less extent, reference was also made to the fact that directors should make a contribution 
in the discussions by sharing information or knowledge and the fact that the board should 
make decisions. 
 
                                                 
 
4
 See Appendix 3, Table D 
5
 See Appendix 3, Table E 
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Individual norms6. We have already touched upon the capacity and quality of the 
individual directors when discussing the composition of the board. In addition, more 
behavioural characteristics were highlighted during the interviews which we labelled as 
‘individual norms’. First, the personality of individual directors seems to matter. In 
particular, aspects such as integrity, ethics, attitude, ego etc. were mentioned. Second, it 
includes the commitment of individual directors referring to the personal enthusiasm, 
interest and availability of people sitting on a board. The least important characteristics 
are the independence of and preparation by individual directors. 
 
Relationship between the board members7. Directors also paid some attention to 
the interpersonal relationships between the board members. Although the frequencies are 
quite low, some related dimensions could be singled out. First, boards need the right 
chemistry and foster cohesiveness. Second, informal contacts and interaction among the 
directors must be stimulated. Third, the board of directors must function as a team. 
Finally, trust and respect between the members are being valued. 
 
Board-management relationship8. The last theme refers to dimensions regarding 
the relationship between the board and management, which could not be grouped within 
the support role of the board. More specifically, this cluster relates to the contact, 
symbioses with and trust in management, as well as to the quality of management. In fact, 
only a few directors mentioned the reliance of the board on a strong and honest 
management as a key criterion for its effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
 
6
 See Appendix 3, Table F 
7
 See Appendix 3, Table G 
8
 See Appendix 3, Table H 
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Quantitative analysis 
The previous section has provided a descriptive analysis of the variety of criteria 
that potentially contribute to the effectiveness of boards. By means of two written 
questionnaires, the qualitative findings are further elaborated.  More specifically, the 
questionnaires offered respondents a set of 10 determinants of board effectiveness. These 
determinants are not mutually exclusive, as some are closely related. The first 
questionnaire was aimed at getting a more profound insight into the importance rate of a 
select number of suggested determinants on a more quantitative base. Descriptive 
statistics for the full sample are given in table 4 in while Appendix 4 provides the detailed 
frequency table.  
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
The results in table 4 show that a relationship of trust between the board and 
CEO/management is perceived to be the most important determinant of board 
effectiveness. The next-best determinants are the composition of the board in terms of 
complementary expertises, and a constructive critical attitude of board members. In 
contrast, a chairman who seeks consensus as well as board members who get along very 
well appear to be of little importance for the effectiveness of boards. 
 
In order to reveal a more fine-grained view on the importance rate, we have 
divided our sample into two groups. A first group represents the “directors” while a 
second group represents the “experts”. In fact, we are interested to see if directors’ 
perceptions on the determinants of board effectiveness differ from those of experts in the 
field of corporate governance. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for both groups. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
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The descriptive results in table 5 indicate some differences between the 
perceptions of directors and experts with respect to the importance rate, as only 3 of the 
10 suggested determinants rank the same (trust between the board and CEO/management, 
sufficient and timely information, consensus-seeking by the chairman). The views of 
directors and experts diverge, in particular, regarding the importance of board members’ 
constructive critical attitude. The deviation in the ranking score is the greatest for this 
determinant (ranked 2nd for directors while 5th for experts). Although our data set can be 
claimed for statistical ordinal testing, it does not fulfil the requirements for the 
computation of a Pearson Chi-Square correlation coefficient mainly because of low 
frequencies per cell (with respect to the responses of the expert group). 
The second questionnaire was used to explore how the suggested determinants 
occur in practice. In particular, it yielded quantitative data reflecting respondents’ 
perceptions on the (same) listed items in terms of their need for improvement. 
Descriptives of the corrigible rate for the full sample are given in table 6 while Appendix 
4 provides the detailed frequency table.  
Insert Table 6 About Here 
The results in table 6 indicate that the preparation of board members, a sufficient 
and timely information flow and the active participation in discussions by all directors are 
most capable of improvement. In contrast, consensus-driven deliberations, guided by the 
chairman and a good relationship among the board members are perceived to be least 
capable of improvement. 
Similar to the analysis of the importance scores, it is possible to reveal a more 
fine-grained view on the corrigible rate, by dividing our sample into two groups. A first 
group represents the “directors” while a second group represents the “experts”. In fact, we 
are interested to see if directors and experts view the need for improvement of the 
suggested determinants differently. Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for both 
groups. 
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Insert Table 7 About Here 
The descriptive results in table 7 indicate great similarities between the 
perceptions of directors and experts with respect to the corrigible rate, as 7 of the 10 
suggested determinants rank the same. The views of directors and experts seem only to 
diverge regarding the need for improvement of tolerating divergent opinions, trust 
between the board of directors and CEO/management and consensus-seeking by the 
chairman. Although our data set can be claimed for statistical ordinal testing, it does not 
fulfil the requirements for the computation of a Pearson Chi-Square correlation 
coefficient mainly because of low frequencies per cell. 
Finally, matching the importance rate of the determinants of board effectiveness to 
their corrigible rate reveals the gaps that exist, and at the same time points out the criteria 
that limit the board’s potential to fulfil its strategic and monitoring role. Figure 2 
illustrates the link between the importance of determinants of board effectiveness and 
their need for improvement.  
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
Quadrant 1 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 1’ 
which we term flashing lights. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are 
perceived to be very important for the effectiveness of boards and at the same time 
require most improvement in practice. Put differently, the findings suggest that too little 
complementarity in the expertises present, absence of a critical attitude in discussions, 
insufficient diversity regarding directors’ roles or unprepared board members may hamper 
the board in carrying out its duties. 
Quadrant 2 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 2’ 
which we term challengers. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are 
perceived to be very important for the effectiveness of boards while at the same time 
require only little or no improvement in practice. It appears that only one criterion fits into 
this quadrant, that is the relationship between the board and management.  
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Although this relationship seems not to pose many problems in practice the 
challenge to maintain a balance of trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management inheres in the governance of every company. A relationship of trust 
can easily be broken at any point in time and therefore requires continuous effort of both 
governing bodies. 
Quadrant 3 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 3’ 
which we term subordinates. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are 
perceived to be of less importance for the effectiveness of boards and at the same time 
require only little or no improvement in practice. These criteria are perceived to be 
inferior compared to the other groups. Our findings suggest that when divergent opinions 
are tolerated in board meetings, the chairman seeks consensus or directors are getting 
along, this does not significantly add value to the ability of a board in performing its roles 
(compared to type 1 and type 2). 
Quadrant 4 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 4’ 
which we term seducers. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are perceived 
to be of less importance for the effectiveness of boards while at the same time being most 
corrigible in practice. The findings suggest that getting appropriate information 
beforehand and watching over an actively participation of all directors in discussions are 
two criteria which should be addressed as practice shows major shortcomings on these 
issues. Still, the danger exists that these criteria might mislead attention and effort from 
the more critical aspects of board effectiveness (type 1 and type 2). 
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DISCUSSION  
Three major points emerge from this study. First, there appears to be a gap 
between a limited number of structural board measures consistently found in literature 
and the broad set of criteria that are emphasized in directors’ perceptions, in particular the 
systematic occurrence of a set of behavioural criteria of board effectiveness. Mainstream 
board research has been heavily influenced by a research tradition from financial 
economics and theories treating the board of directors as a “black box”. Although boards 
of directors are frequently studied in academic research, scholars have traditionally 
focused on a limited number of characteristics such as board size, board composition and 
board leadership. These structural measures are commonly viewed as appropriate and 
adequate proxies for understanding board effectiveness, while the working processes of 
boards or individual directors’ behaviour are rarely investigated. A such, the various 
research streams suggest that if the structure of a board is appropriate, the board should be 
able to fulfil its duties, and ultimately enhance corporate performance. However, little 
convincing evidence exists that these structural measures, which are presumed to 
contribute to the effectiveness of boards as guardians of shareholders’ welfare, have had 
considerable impact on the financial performance of companies. Moreover, the data 
collected in this study reveals a huge discrepancy between the criteria found in academic 
literature and the perceptions of the directors themselves. Our qualitative findings have 
revealed an enlarged set of board attributes and suggest a more prominent role for 
intangible or ‘soft’ factors as determinants for board effectiveness. More then half of the 
directors interviewed put great emphasis on the informal rules which regulate board and 
directors’ behaviour (‘board culture’), while more then fourth stressed the importance of 
debate as a criteria for a good corporate board. The quantitative results retrieved from the 
questionnaires elaborate this qualitative evidence. They highlight the importance of trust 
between the board and CEO/management as well as the behaviour of board members with 
respect to their preparation, participation and critical attitude in boardroom deliberations. 
Our findings suggest that board of directors and board effectiveness in particular, should 
also be understood through attributes reflecting the board’s inner workings and not solely 
through attributes of board structure and composition. Besides, our findings are to a large 
extent consistent and supported with evidence from other qualitative board studies.  
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The latter have also drawn attention to the importance of the human element in 
board effectiveness. A climate of trust and candour, a culture of open dissent, collective 
wisdom, collective strength and behavioural expectations are some of the elements put 
forward to increase board performance (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Charan, 2005; Carter 
and Lorsch, 2004; Sonnenfeld, 2002).  
A second major point is that the value of independence may be overemphasized at 
the cost of the broader issue of diversity. Stimulated by the dominance of the agency 
perspective in corporate governance, board effectiveness has commonly been approached 
as the ability of boards to act independently from management. Board independence has 
been the cornerstone of the corporate governance debate, although considerable divergent 
views exist both on the right proportion of independent directors and their definition (Van 
den Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Daily et.al. 1999;). It is assumed that independent 
directors add real value to a company and arguments in favour of their appointment are 
well-documented (Felton et.al., 1995). Corporate governance reforms tend to support the 
plea for board independence by advocating that a critical mass of independent directors is 
essential for a board to be able to provide critical oversight. Although our findings also 
highlight the importance of having a sufficient mix of directors’ roles in terms of 
executives, non-executives and independent directors, they suggest that competencies, 
diversity and complementarity are more pivotal attributes for board effectiveness. These 
criteria were among the most cited in the interviews and the dimension of 
complementarity systematically received high rankings in the questionnaires. Still, the 
issue of diversity is to a large extent neglected in board research in spite of the fact that a 
small number of studies already presented interesting findings. For example, Golden and 
Zajac (2001) found that specific types of directors’ expertise or experience are influential 
in shaping the orientation of a board toward strategic change. In addition, corporate 
governance and shareholder activists are increasingly becoming convinced by the added 
value of diversity in terms of improved decision-making.  
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Boards have commonly been viewed as homogenous groups of executives and 
non-executives directors who are cut from the same cloth and it is argued that this 
uniformity undermines the quality and variety of boardroom debate (Grady, 1999). 
Consequently, institutional investors have begun to pressure companies to diversify their 
board composition with respect to gender, race and type of expertise. TIAA-CREF, for 
example, puts major focus on qualified directors who reflect a diversity of background 
and experience (TIAA-CREF, 2006). 
A third major issue is that mainstream board research ignores to a large extent two 
additional conditions under which a board of directors can make an effective contribution 
to the strategic direction and control of a company. First, our findings suggest that board 
members should become sufficiently knowledgeable about the particular company 
context. During the interviews, the aspect of preparation of board meetings in terms of 
agenda and information provided to directors was frequently cited. The quantitative 
evidence endorsed this finding as both timely and sufficient information and the 
preparation of board members received high rankings scores as determinants of board 
effectiveness. The need to adequately inform board members is also recognized by other 
scholars involved in qualitative board research. It is generally accepted that non-executive 
and independent directors face a disadvantageous position with regard to information 
gathering. Non-executive and independent directors, who spend only a limited amount of 
time with the company, can never know as much as the executive directors. They depend 
to a large extent on the goodwill of the management to obtain relevant and timely 
information. Consequently, it is assumed that in order to be able to perform its duties, 
directors need to be well informed at all times (Charan, 1998). The corporate scandals are 
only some examples of boards that knew too little too late. In addition, it is noted that a 
dysfunctional information flow may hinder the performance of boards. Some boards 
receive bundles of documents, but only a small part may be useful in gaining an 
understanding of the real issues the board should be addressing (Monk and Minow, 1996). 
Also Lorsch and MacIver (1989), in studying American boards, reported that information 
is often provided in such a complex way that directors have a problem in interpreting and 
using it.  
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A study by Lawler et. al. (2001) points out that those boards whose directors have 
a greater amount of relevant information appear to perform their roles more effectively 
than boards that are less well informed. Second, our findings suggest a pivotal role of the 
chairman in the effectiveness of boards. In particular, the qualitative data suggest that the 
leadership style of the chairman plays a major role in the way the board is able to carry 
out its duties. However, the academic governance literature traditionally looks at the issue 
of board leadership in quite narrow terms by focusing the discussion on the relationship of 
the chairman and the CEO. Especially, the question whether the two functions should be 
separated or not has received considerable attention and continues to be subject to much 
debate. Still, the effects of a separation of roles have not been consistently substantiated 
by empirical evidence. In addition, only a handful of studies exist, which have examined 
the role of the chairman and its impact on the effectiveness of boards. For example, 
Roberts (2002) documents how the unskilful management of board relationships and 
processes can easily disable a board in its decision-making and performance. Based on the 
nature of chairman/chief executive relationships, he distinguishes three dysfunctional 
board dynamics – a competitive, personal and captured board - with negative 
consequences for board effectiveness. Also the earlier study of Pettigrew and McNulty 
(1995) already pointed to the key role a chairman plays in shaping board dynamics and 
transforming a ‘minimalist’ board to a ‘maximalist’ board, having a strong impact on the 
direction of a company. However, an unexpected finding in our study relates to the role of 
the chairman in board decision-making. The results from the written questionnaire 
suggest that in order for the board to be effective it is not important that a chairman seeks 
consensus. As such, this finding does not support the study of Hill (1995) who found that 
maintaining boardroom consensus was a fundamental value among all directors he 
surveyed and which was definitely the norm within the executive grouping. A possible 
explanation relates to the interpretation of the notion of consensus. Additional comments 
by directors revealed that consensus might be interpreted as ‘unanimity’ and consequently 
bias responses. They noted that a good board of directors reach a decision that is 
supported by all board members even though there exists personal disagreement. 
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CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this study was to get a better understanding of the various criteria 
that contribute to the effectiveness of boards. In order to do so, we conducted an in-depth 
review of the literature and complemented the insights with the findings of an extensive 
field study. The analysis is primarily intended to be exploratory and descriptive while 
using both qualitative and quantitative data. The first research phase is based on a large 
number of interviews and yielded a broad spectrum of criteria that constitutes a good 
board of directors, as perceived by the directors. By coding the criteria and clustering 
them into separate groups we were able to grasp the variety of criteria. Moreover, the 
technique of counting (the frequency a criterion was mentioned) provided a first 
indication of which criteria matter more. The importance rate of a limited number of 
potential determinants of board effectiveness was further examined in the quantitative 
research phase by means of a written questionnaire. In addition, a second questionnaire 
was used to further elaborate the findings by exploring how the suggested determinants 
occur in practice. The overall results raised three major issues which were then discussed 
more in-depth. What becomes clear by our research is that many aspects of board 
effectiveness are invisible to ‘outsiders’ and as a result poorly understood. Most 
researchers have remained at a considerable distance from actual board practice, partly 
because of difficulties of gaining access. By consequence, they focus their attention on a 
small number of structural board characteristics leading to inconclusive findings. Our 
findings suggest that this ambiguity in current research evidence can to some extent be 
attributed to the ignorance of a wide range of interconnected structural (such as diversity 
and competence) and more behavioural factors (such as trust, attitude, norms and 
conduct) which actually shape the effectiveness of boards in performing their roles. 
Various avenues of further research can be identified. First, our study is limited to 
a description of a broad set of criteria which are presumed to have an impact on board 
effectiveness. At this stage, we are unable to pronounce upon the way the different criteria 
interact. More research is required to examine the interrelationship between the criteria in 
order to develop a new theoretical model for board effectiveness or to adjust and refine 
existing board models. It is also advocated to test the identified relationships on a large 
scale to validate the new proxies that can be used to measure board effectiveness.  
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Second, no reference was made to contingencies which may influence the 
effectiveness of boards and hence directors’ perceptions. In particular, it can be stated that 
specific board attributes that are beneficial for one company may turn out to be 
detrimental to an other. By consequence, it is suggested to get a better insight into the 
context and to identify the conditions under which a board can or will be effective in 
performing its roles. Third, the findings of the study also point to the need of a multi-
disciplinary approach in board research. The latter should not be restricted to the use of 
different research techniques but should also incorporate relevant literature, such as 
literature on group effectiveness, TMT decision-making, organizational demography etc.   
This study makes at least three contributions to the corporate governance 
literature. A first contribution stems from the study of boards of directors in a non-US 
context using an alternative research methodology. In spite of the intense research interest 
in corporate governance systems and mechanisms around the world (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), most (empirical) studies on boards of directors have been carried out by 
using samples of large US corporations and are inspired by quantitative US research 
traditions (Huse, 2005). In contrast, qualitative studies on boards of directors as well as 
research of boards in European contexts are still very scarce. Our research contributes to 
reduce the observed gap in existing board literature by studying boards of directors in a 
Belgian context with a qualitative-oriented research approach (mixed methods design). 
Second, our study also emphasizes the potential importance of board diversity as 
additional (structural) measure of board composition. Rather than approaching the board 
of directors exclusively in terms of insiders versus outsiders, researchers should consider 
to integrate measures of diversity that reflect the differences in backgrounds, experiences 
and skills (Kosnik, 1990). Third, this study also stresses the need to examine the inner 
workings of boards. A common feature of mainstream board research is the treatment of 
the board of directors as a “black box” (Daily et.al., 2003). The inconclusive findings of 
studying direct relationships between board characteristics and performance outcomes, 
however, raise doubt on the explanatory power of these input-output models. One way to 
make progress in board research is to develop and adopt indirect research models which 
take into account more behavioural aspects of board conduct. 
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APPENDIX 1  
EXAMPLE OF THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE (in Dutch) 
Board effectiveness 
Hieronder vindt u een lijst met tien stellingen. De stellingen omvatten diverse aspecten 
die de doeltreffendheid van de raad van bestuur kunnen beïnvloeden. “Board 
effectiveness” wordt daarbij gedefinieerd als “de mate waarin de raad van bestuur zijn 
strategische en controlerende rol vervult”.  Deze stellingen zijn gebaseerd op een 
uitgebreide literatuurstudie en eerder uitgevoerd kwalitatief onderzoek. De bedoeling is 
dat u volgende stellingen naar belangrijkheid rangschikt in dalende orde (1 MEEST 
belangrijk – 10 MINST belangrijk).  
 
 
OPDAT DE RVB ZIJN STRATEGISCHE EN CONTROLERENDE ROL ZOU KUNNEN VERVULLEN IS 
HET BELANGRIJK DAT …… 
RANGORDE 
Er in de RvB zowel leden van het management, onafhankelijke bestuurders als 
vertegenwoordigers van de aandeelhouders zetelen 
10 
De bestuurders goed voorbereid zijn 5 
Alle bestuurders actief deelnemen aan de discussies  4 
De bestuurders constructief kritisch ingesteld zijn 3 
Er vertrouwen is tussen de raad van bestuur en CEO/management 9 
De voorzitter consensus nastreeft 1 
De informatie voldoende en tijdig is 2 
Afwijkende visies getolereerd worden 8 
Er complementariteit is op vlak van achtergrond, expertise en ervaring 7 
De bestuurders goed met elkaar opschieten 6 
 
 
Uw e-mail : ……………………………………………… 
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EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE (in Dutch) 
 
Board effectiveness : deel 2 
Hieronder vindt u een lijst met tien stellingen. De stellingen omvatten diverse aspecten 
die de doeltreffendheid van de raad van bestuur kunnen beïnvloeden. “Board 
effectiveness” wordt daarbij gedefinieerd als “de mate waarin de raad van bestuur zijn 
strategische en controlerende rol vervult”.  Deze stellingen zijn gebaseerd op een 
uitgebreide literatuurstudie en eerder uitgevoerd kwalitatief onderzoek. De bedoeling is 
dat u, vanuit uw bestuurservaring, aangeeft welke aspecten in de praktijk het meest 
voor verbetering vatbaar zijn. Gelieve deze in dalende volgorde te rangschikken (1 
MEEST voor verbetering vatbaar – 10 MINST voor verbetering vatbaar).   
 
 
 RANGORDE 
De informatie is voldoende en tijdig 5 
De bestuurders zijn constructief kritisch ingesteld 6 
De bestuurders zijn goed voorbereid  1 
Alle bestuurders nemen actief deel aan de discussies  4 
Complementariteit op vlak van achtergrond, expertise en ervaring 2 
Er is vertrouwen tussen de raad van bestuur en CEO/management 8 
De voorzitter streeft consensus na 9 
Afwijkende visies worden getolereerd  7 
Mix management, onafhankelijke bestuurders en vertegenwoordigers van de 
aandeelhouders 
3 
De bestuurders kunnen goed met elkaar opschieten 10 
 
 
Uw e-mail :……………………………….. 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
 
FAMILY 
 
 
 
CODE 
 
 
 
INTERPRETATION/DEFINITION 
 
DEBATE/DECISION-MAKING 
  
 occurence refers to the fact that discussions take place; no rubber-stamping 
  
 
quality 
 
refers to the characteristics of the discussions such as neutral, objective, in-depth, 
open, critical, emotionless, based on facts, to the point …. 
  
 
contribution 
 
relates to the participation in the discussions and the assumption that members 
contribute during the disscusions (e.g. sharing of knowledge, information, ideas etc) 
  
decision 
 
refers to the fact that decisions are taken  
 
 
BOARD CULTURE   
  
active involvement 
refers to the fact that a board is interested and involved in the company; it takes 
initiatives, learns and contributes in contrast to a formal, passive board 
  
 
openness 
 
refers to an open culture, the possibility or ability to express an opinion, 
transparency …. 
  
critical 
 
refers to a critical attitude/behaviour 
  
common values or goal 
 
refers to the fact that group members have a common denominator 
  
 
atmosphere-climate 
 
relates to other unwritten rules or standards such as humour, a positive and 
constructive mind, professionalism, passion for excellence …. 
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INDIVIDUAL NORMS   
  
commitment 
refers to the fact that individual members are interested, involved and available 
(sufficient time) 
  
preparation 
 
refers to the fact that individual members are prepared (e.g. read the documents) 
  
 
personality 
 
relates to characteristics of the personality of individual members such as 
humility, ego, attitude, sense of responsibility, integrity, ethical 
  
 
independence 
 
refers to the courage of individual members to speak up and to show an 
independent mind 
   
   
 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE 
BOARD MEMBERS 
  
  
cohesiveness 
 
refers to the chemistry and the fact that board members cohere 
  
respect 
 
refers to the fact that the board members respect each other 
  
team 
 
refers to the fact that board members operate as a team/group 
  
trust 
 
refers to the trust among the board members 
  
 
contact 
 
refers to the interaction, dynamic and the informal contacts between the board 
members 
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BOARD TASKS   
  
context 
refers to the conditions which are necessary to fullfil the tasks (e.g. delegation, 
position within the CG-tripod) 
  
 
control  
 
relates to the monitoring tasks a board is expected to fullfil (financial, legal, 
internal governance etc.) 
  
strategy 
 
relates to the involvement of the board in the strategic process 
  
 
support 
 
relates to the interaction of the board with its management (challenging, 
stimulating, sounding board, advising etc.) 
 
BOARD-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
  
 relationship with 
management 
relates to the contact, symbiose with and trust in management, as well as to the 
quality of management 
 
BOARD COMPOSITION   
  
competence 
refers to the fact that experienced, high-quality and competent members are 
sitting on the board 
  
complementarity 
 
refers to the fact that members complement each other 
  
 
diversity 
 
refers to the fact that members differ in background, views, experience, 
nationality etc. 
  
 
mix 
 
refers to the fact that various categories of directors are represented (executives, 
non-executives and independent directors) 
  
size 
 
relates to the limitation on the number of directors 
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OPERATIONS OF THE BOARD   
  
meeting 
relates to the characteristics of the board meeting such as frequencie, timing, 
presentations, minutes 
  
 
preparation 
 
refers to the fact that the board meeting should be well-prepared in terms of 
agenda and information provided to the members 
  
chairmanship 
 
relates to the quality and role of the chairman of the board 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A : detailed overview of elements of cluster 1 
Board composition Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Diversity 30 28,85% N=31 
Complementarity 27 25,96% N=27 
Competence 25 24,04% N=25 
Mix (executive/non-executive) 10 9,62% N=11 
Size 7 6,73% N=7 
Total 99 95,19% N= 101 
 
 
 
Table B : detailed overview of elements of cluster 2 
Board culture Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Openness 17 16,35% N=17 
Active involvement 15 14,42% N=15 
Atmosphere-climate 11 10,58% N=12 
Common values or goal 6 5,77% N=7 
Critical 4 3,85% N=4 
Total 53 50,96% N= 55 
 
 
 
Table C : detailed overview of elements of cluster 3 
Operations of the board Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Preparation 23 22,12% N=27 
Chairmanship 18 17,31% N=18 
Meeting 8 7,69% N=9 
Total 49 47,12% N= 54 
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Table D : detailed overview of elements of cluster 4 
Board tasks Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Strategy 15 14,42% N=17 
Support 9 8,65% N=9 
Context 5 4,81% N=6 
Control 5 4,81% N=5 
Total 34 32,69% N= 37 
 
 
 
Table E : detailed overview of elements of cluster 5 
Debate/decision-making Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Quality 10 9,62% N=11 
Occurrence 10 9,62% N=10 
Contribution 5 4,81% N=5 
Decision 3 2,88% N=3 
Total 28 26,92% N= 29 
 
 
 
 
Table F : detailed overview of elements of cluster 6 
Individual norms Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Personality 9 8,65% N=10 
Commitment 8 7,69% N=10 
Independence 6 5,77% N=6 
Preparation 2 1,92% N=2 
Total 25 24,04% N= 28 
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Table G : detailed overview of elements of cluster 7 
Relationship among the 
board members 
Number of 
respondents 
who mentioned 
this element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Cohesiveness 8 7,69% N=8 
Contact 5 4,81% N=5 
Team 5 4,81% N=5 
Respect 3 2,88% N=3 
Trust 2 1,92% N=2 
Total 23 22,12% N= 23 
 
 
 
 
Table H : detailed overview of elements of cluster 8 
Board-management 
relationship 
Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this elemet is 
reported 
Relationship with management 6 5,77% N=7 
Total 6 5,77% N= 7 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table I: frequency table of importance ranking scores for the full sample (N=150) 
Determinants of board effectiveness 1* 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10** 
           
The board of directors includes a mix of 
executives, independent directors and non-
executives representing the shareholders 
24,0% 11,3% 5,3% 6,0% 8,7% 7,3% 8,7% 8,7% 8,7% 11,3% 
The board members are well-prepared 8,7% 12,7% 18,7% 18,7% 16,7% 10,7% 7,3% 5,3% 1,3% 0,0% 
All directors actively participate in the 
discussions 
4,0% 4,7% 10,7% 11,3% 12,0% 12,0% 12,7% 13,3% 12,7% 6,7% 
Board members show a constructive critical 
attitude 
10,7% 18,7% 16,0% 18,0% 8,0% 16,0% 6,7% 3,3% 1,3% 1,3% 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management 
25,3% 12,0% 13,3% 8,0% 8,0% 9,3% 10,7% 7,3% 4,7% 1,3% 
The chairman seeks consensus 2,0% 2,0% 3,3% 2,0% 7,3% 7,3% 16,0% 16,7% 31,3% 12,0% 
The information is sufficient and on time 5,3% 14,0% 13,3% 12,0% 16,0% 13,3% 9,3% 8,7% 4,7% 3,3% 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 3,3% 2,7% 8,7% 12,0% 12,0% 15,3% 14,0% 19,3% 11,3% 1,3% 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 
15,3% 20,0% 10,0% 10,7% 10,7% 7,3% 10,7% 8,0% 5,3% 2,0% 
Board members get along very well 1,3% 2,0% 0,7% 1,3% 0,7% 1,3% 4,0% 9,3% 18,7% 60,7% 
* score 1 denotes ‘item is most important’  
**score 10 denotes ‘item is least important’ 
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Table J: frequency table of corrigible ranking scores for the full sample (N=75) 
*score 1 denotes ‘item needs most improvement’ 
** score 10 denotes ‘item needs least improvement’ 
 
 
Determinants of board effectiveness 1* 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10** 
 
 
         
The board of directors includes a mix of 
executives, independent directors and non-
executives representing the shareholders 
13,3% 6,7% 8,0% 6,7% 4,0% 6,7% 9,3% 10,7% 18,7% 16,0% 
The board members are well-prepared 20,0% 25,3% 18,7% 12,0% 12,0% 6,7% 1,3% 0,0% 2,7% 1,3% 
All directors actively participate in the 
discussions 8,0% 14,7% 20,0% 20,0% 4,0% 10,7% 9,3% 6,7% 4,0% 2,7% 
Board members show a constructive critical 
attitude 4,0% 9,3% 14,7% 21,3% 13,3% 13,3% 8,0% 8,0% 2,7% 5,3% 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management 0,0% 5,3% 5,3% 4,0% 10,7% 8,0% 21,3% 16,0% 20,0% 9,3% 
The chairman seeks consensus 0,0% 2,7% 5,3% 1,3% 16,0% 13,3% 12,0% 14,7% 16,0% 18,7% 
The information is sufficient and on time 29,3% 17,3% 10,7% 5,3% 13,3% 4,0% 5,3% 5,3% 5,3% 4,0% 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 6,7% 4,0% 4,0% 8,0% 12,0% 18,7% 20,0% 14,7% 10,7% 1,3% 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 17,3% 13,3% 10,7% 16,0% 12,0% 12,0% 2,7% 8,0% 4,0% 4,0% 
Board members get along very well 1,3% 1,3% 2,7% 5,3% 2,7% 6,7% 10,7% 16,0% 16,0% 37,3% 
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TABLE 1 
(qualitative) sample per directors’ role 
 
Directors’ role Number 
Chairmen 41 
Chairman = CEO 18 
Chairman = independent director 11 
Chairman = non-executive director 12 
Executive directors 35 
CEOs 30 
Other executives    5 
Non-executive directors 25 
Independent directors 21 
Non-executive shareholders’ representatives   4 
Secretary-generals   3 
Total 104 
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TABLE 1 
(quantitative) sample per group of respondents 
 
Respondent Number 
Directors 119 
Representing listed companies   12 
 Representing non-listed companies  107 
Experts 31 
Total 150 
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TABLE 2 
 
Ingredients of a good corporate board - directors' perspectives 
 
Families Number of 
respondents 
who referred 
to this theme  
 
% of 
respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this 
theme was 
reported 
Theme 1: board composition 99 95% N=101 
Theme 2: board culture 53 51% N=55 
Theme 3: operation of the board 49 47% N=54 
Theme 4: board tasks 34 33% N=37 
Theme 5: debate/decision-making 28 27% N=29 
Theme 6: individual norms 25 24% N=28 
Theme 7: relationships between the board members 23 22% N=23 
Theme 8: board-management relationship 6 6% N=7 
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TABLE 3 
 
Descriptive statistics of importance rate for the full sample (N=150) 
 
* denotes the frequency the item received a ranking score ≤3 
 
Determinants of board effectiveness in top 3* Rank 
 
# %  
Trust between the board of directors and CEO/management  76 50,6 1 
Complementarity with respect to background, expertise and experience 68 45,3 2 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude  68 45,3 2 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, independent 
directors and non-executives representing the shareholders 
61 40,6 4 
The board members are well-prepared 60 40,0 5 
The information is sufficient and on time 49 32,6 6 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  29 19,3 7 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 22 14,6 8 
The chairman seeks consensus  11 7,3 9 
Board members get along very well 6 4,0 10 
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TABLE 4 
 
Descriptive statistics of importance rate for sub-samples 
 
 * denotes the frequency the item received a ranking score ≤3 
 DIRECTORS (N=119) EXPERTS (N=31) 
 in top 3*  in top 3*  
Determinants of board effectiveness # % Rank # % Rank 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management  
59 49,6 1 17 54,8 1 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude 58 48,7 2 13 32,3 5 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 
51 42,9 3 17 54,8 1 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, 
independent directors and non-executives 
representing the shareholders 
47 39,5 4 14 45,2 3 
The board members are well-prepared 46 38,7 5 14 45,2 3 
The information is sufficient and on time 37 31,1 6 12 38,7 6 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  27 22,7 7 2 6,5 8 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 17 14,3 8 5 16,1 7 
The chairman seeks consensus  10 8,4 9 1 3,2 9 
Board members get along very well 5 4,2 10 1 3,2 9 
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Table 5: descriptive statistics of corrigible rate for the full sample (N=75) 
 
Determinants of board effectiveness in top 3* rank 
 
# %  
The board members are well-prepared 48 64,0 1 
The information is sufficient and on time 43 57,3 2 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  32 42,7 3 
Complementarity with respect to background, expertise and experience 31 41,3 4 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude  21 28,0 5 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, independent directors 
and non-executives representing the shareholders 
21 28,0 6 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 11 14,7 7 
Trust between the board of directors and CEO/management  8 10,7 8 
The chairman seeks consensus  6 8,0 9 
Board members get along very well 4 5,3 10 
* denotes the frequency the item received a ranking score ≤3 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive statistics of corrigible rate for sub-samples 
 
 DIRECTORS (N=56) EXPERTS (N=19) 
 in top 3*  in top 3*  
Determinants of board effectiveness # % rank # % rank 
The board members are well-prepared 37 66,1 1 11 57,9 1 
The information is sufficient and on time 33 58,9 2 10 52,6 2 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  25 44,6 3 7 36,8 3 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 
25 44,6 4 6 31,6 4 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude  16 28,6 5 5 26,3 5 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, 
independent directors and non-executives 
representing the shareholders 
16 28,6 5 5 26,3 5 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 6 10,7 7 5 26,3 5 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management  
6 10,7 8 2 10,5 9 
The chairman seeks consensus  2 3,6 9 4 21,1 8 
Board members get along very well 2 3,6 9 2 10,5 9 
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FIGURE 2 
Linking importance and corrigible scores of determinants of board effectiveness9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
9
 For the sake of presenting the results more clearly in the picture, we have reversed the values of the 
importance and corrigible scores  
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